查看购物车
  • Traditional Chinese
  • English
  • Japanese
中国汽车半导体市场：按零件划分、全球半导体出口趋势、中国半导体出口目的地趋势、策略建议
市场调查报告书
商品编码
1759939

中国汽车半导体市场：按零件划分、全球半导体出口趋势、中国半导体出口目的地趋势、策略建议

China Semiconductor Market for Automotive by Component (Microcontroller, Power Semiconductor, Sensor & MEMS Device, Memory Chip, Analog & Mixed Signal IC), Global & China Semiconductor Export, Alternate Destination - Trends and Strategic Recommendation
出版日期: | 出版商: MarketsandMarkets | 英文 104 Pages | 订单完成后即时交付

价格

到2024年，中国汽车半导体出口额将达到4,191.5亿美元，高于2020年的2,808.1亿美元，复合年增长率为8.9%，这得益于自动驾驶汽车和电动车销量的成长。

中国汽车半导体市场正吸引国内外企业庞大投资。中芯国际、华为海思、长江储存、比亚迪半导体和紫光集团等领导企业主导国内半导体市场的发展，而英特尔、三星和SK海力士等国际企业则透过合资企业和新建製造工厂扩大其影响力。中国政府正透过国家积体电路产业投资基金（简称「大基金」）、地方政府基金、补贴、税收减免和低利率贷款等政策支持该市场，力求自给自足并建构完整的供应链。随着全球对先进电子和汽车技术的需求飙升，中国正利用香港作为贸易中心，向全球出口半导体。现代汽车（尤其是电动车和联网汽车）的兴起，显着增加了对半导体的需求。这些汽车需要先进的晶片来实现动力传动系统控制、高级驾驶辅助、资讯娱乐和电池管理。因此，汽车产业已成为中国半导体成长的主要驱动力。

记忆体晶片在中国汽车半导体市场排名第二。随着人工智慧、资料中心、消费性电子产品和先进汽车技术的推动，资料储存和资料处理需求飙升，记忆体晶片也在全球半导体产业中占据第二位。记忆体晶片对于电子设备中资料的储存和搜寻至关重要，支援从应用程式执行到即时系统运行的所有功能。对于依赖大量数据实现资讯娱乐、ADAS、无人驾驶等功能的现代汽车而言，记忆体晶片至关重要。记忆体晶片广泛应用于高阶资讯娱乐系统、ADAS和仪錶板。由于复杂的计算和数据处理需求，电动车和自动驾驶汽车需要更大的记忆体。在加强成熟节点晶片国产化的同时，中国正致力于在先进记忆体技术（尤其是NAND和DRAM）方面取得重大进展，长江储存和长鑫储存等公司处于领先地位。长江储存已经开发出先进的3D TLC NAND晶片，可以与三星和美光等全球领导者竞争。中芯国际也为华为Mate 60 Pro生产7奈米晶片。

印度是世界第二大电子设备、积体电路和记忆体晶片进口国。这主要归功于该国强劲的电子产业、数位化以及缺乏大规模的国内半导体製造业。到 2024 年，光是从中国进口的电子积体电路就将达到 610 万美元。这些组件对于汽车领域的资讯娱乐、ADAS、远端讯息和数位仪錶板等高级功能至关重要，这些功能需要庞大的记忆体和处理能力。受消费者对连结性、安全性和电气化日益增长的需求的推动，印度的高级汽车功能市场正在快速成长。在混合动力汽车动力和电动车快速采用和製造 (FAME) 计划等政府倡议的支持下，电动车和联网汽车的普及正在加速。对印度电子和半导体生态系统的投资也在增加，国内外公司都在扩大生产和研发。印度政府推出了一系列奖励计划，例如针对电子产品製造业的「生产挂钩奖励计划」（PLI），进一步刺激了对进口记忆体和积体电路的需求，因为国内供应难以跟上。近期的例子包括塔塔汽车和马恆达等汽车製造商在其最新车款中融入先进的电子产品，这反映出印度汽车和电子产业技术主导成长的普遍趋势。

本报告深入分析了中国汽车半导体市场，重点关注各种类型的半导体，包括微控制器、功率半导体、感测器和MEMS装置、储存晶片、类比和混合讯号积体电路等。报告也检验了出口趋势、贸易政策和法规的影响，以及半导体产业在中国以外的多元化发展。报告也探讨了替代生产地点，并对这些地点进行了比较分析，以及转型过程中面临的挑战和策略。

此外，该报告评估了全球汽车产业对半导体市场的影响，并提供了未来展望。报告还提供了推动中国半导体市场成长的关键因素的详细资讯。对主要产业参与企业的深入分析，提供了对其业务概况、产品供应、关键策略、合约、伙伴关係、协议、新产品发布、併购活动的深入了解。

本报告为市场领导和新进业者提供了有关中国汽车半导体市场及其细分市场收益估算的宝贵资讯。它将帮助相关人员了解竞争格局，更有效地定位业务，并制定合适的打入市场策略。此外，报告还深入分析了当前的市场情势，并重点介绍了产业内的关键驱动因素、限制因素、挑战和机会。

目录

第一章 引言

第二章 中国汽车半导体产业

  • 中国汽车半导体现状
    • 微控制器
    • 功率半导体
    • 感测器和MEMS
    • 记忆体晶片
    • 类比和混合讯号积体电路
  • 市场估值

第三章：中国汽车半导体产业主要参与企业

  • 国内厂商
    • SMIC
    • GIGADEVICE
    • NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS
    • SILAN MICROELECTRONICS
    • HISILICON
    • HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED
    • BYD SEMICONDUCTOR
    • NEXPERIA
    • CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES
    • YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP
    • GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.
    • CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED
    • HESAI TECHNOLOGY
    • 其他的
  • 在中国的全球製造商
    • NXP SEMICONDUCTORS
    • INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
    • STMICROELECTRONICS
    • TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
    • RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
  • 合资企业和策略伙伴关係

第四章 中国汽车半导体出口分析

  • 主要出口产品类型
  • 全球半导体出口
  • 中国出口

第五章 中国汽车半导体产业多元化发展

  • 地缘政治因素
  • 供应链弹性策略
  • 经济因素
  • 对全球汽车产业的影响

第六章 替代製造地

  • 概述
  • 替代製造地的比较分析
  • 国家/地区技术优势
  • 东南亚
    • 马来西亚
    • 越南
    • 泰国
    • 新加坡
    • 韩国
    • 台湾
  • 北美洲
  • 欧洲
  • 印度

第七章 未来展望与建议

  • 2025 年至 2030 年预测的产业转变
  • 技术蓝图
  • 向产业相关人员提出策略建议
Product Code: AT 9433

In 2024, China's exports of automotive semiconductors reached USD 419.15 billion in 2024, from USD 280.81 billion in 2020, with a CAGR of 8.9%, driven by increased sales of autonomous and electric vehicles.

China's semiconductor market for the automotive sector is experiencing substantial investment from both domestic and global companies. Major players such as SMIC, Huawei's HiSilicon, YMTC, BYD Semiconductor, and Tsinghua Unigroup are leading domestic efforts, while international firms like Intel, Samsung, and SK Hynix are expanding their presence through joint ventures and new fabrication plants. The Chinese government supports the market with the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund ("Big Fund"), local government funds, subsidies, tax breaks, and low-interest loans, all aimed at achieving self-sufficiency and a complete supply chain. As global demand for advanced electronics and automotive technologies surges, China exports semiconductors worldwide, often using Hong Kong as a trade hub. The rise of modern vehicles, primarily electric and connected cars, has significantly increased the demand for semiconductors, as these vehicles require advanced chips for powertrain control, advanced driver assistance, infotainment, and battery management. Consequently, the automotive sector has become a key driver of semiconductor growth in China.

Memory chips are the second-largest segment in China's automotive semiconductor market.

Memory chips rank second in the Chinese automotive semiconductor market. These chips also hold the second-largest position in the global semiconductor industry due to soaring demand for data storage and processing, driven by AI, data centers, consumer electronics, and advanced automotive technologies. Memory chips are vital for storing and retrieving data in electronic devices, enabling everything from application execution to real-time system operations-an essential requirement for modern vehicles that rely on significant amounts of data for infotainment, ADAS, and autonomous driving features. Memory chips are extensively used in high-end infotainment systems, ADAS, and digital instrument clusters in cars. Electric and autonomous vehicles demand even more memory due to their complex computing and data processing needs. China is focusing on boosting domestic production of mature-node chips while also making significant advancements in advanced memory technology, particularly in NAND and DRAM, with companies like YMTC and CXMT leading the way. YMTC has developed advanced 3D TLC NAND chips that compete with global leaders like Samsung and Micron, while CXMT has produced and released G4 DDR5 DRAM. SMIC has also manufactured 7 nm chips for Huawei's Mate 60 Pro.

India is the second-largest importer of semiconductors from China.

India is the second-largest importer of electronics, integrated circuits, and memory chips worldwide. This is primarily due to the country's robust electronics sector, digitalization, and the lack of large-scale domestic semiconductor manufacturing. In 2024, imports of electronic integrated circuits from China alone reached USD 6.1 million. These components are essential in the automotive sector for advanced features such as infotainment, ADAS, telematics, and digital instrument clusters, which require significant memory and processing power. The Indian market for advanced automotive features is rapidly growing, driven by rising consumer demand for connectivity, safety, and electrification. The adoption of EVs and connected cars is accelerating, supported by government initiatives like the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Hybrid and Electric Vehicles (FAME) scheme. Investment in India's electronics and semiconductor ecosystem is also on the rise, with both domestic and international companies expanding production and R&D. The government has launched incentive programs such as the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for electronics manufacturing, further increasing demand for imported memory and integrated circuits as local supply struggles to keep pace. Recent examples include automakers like Tata Motors and Mahindra integrating more sophisticated electronics into their latest models, reflecting the broader trend of technology-driven growth in India's automotive and electronics sectors.

Research Coverage:

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the China semiconductor market for automotive, focusing on various types, including microcontrollers, power semiconductors, sensors & MEMS devices, memory chips, and analog & mixed-signal integrated circuits. It examines export trends, the impact of trade policies and restrictions, and the diversification of the semiconductor industry away from China. The report also explores alternative manufacturing destinations, offering a comparative analysis of these locations, along with the challenges and strategies associated with the transition.

Additionally, the report assesses the effects of the global automotive sector on the semiconductor market and presents a future outlook. It includes detailed information about the major factors driving growth in China's semiconductor market. A thorough analysis of key industry players provides insights into their business overviews, product offerings, key strategies, contracts, partnerships, agreements, new product launches, mergers, and acquisitions.

Key Benefits of Buying this Report:

The report provides valuable information for market leaders and new entrants regarding revenue estimates for both the overall automotive semiconductor market in China and its sub-segments. It will assist stakeholders in understanding the competitive landscape, positioning their businesses more effectively, and planning appropriate go-to-market strategies. Additionally, the report offers insights into the current market conditions and highlights key drivers, restraints, challenges, and opportunities within the industry.

The report provides insights into the following points:

  • Analysis of critical drivers (increased domestic investments in semiconductors), restraints (shortage of manufacturing facilities for 12 mm machines), opportunities (substantial investments by <12-inch wafer manufacturers), and challenges (technological gap) influencing the growth of the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Product Development/Innovation: Detailed insights into upcoming technologies and new products launched in the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Market Development: Comprehensive market information - the report analyses the authentication and brand protection market across Chinese countries
  • Market Diversification: Exhaustive information about new products & services, untapped geographies, recent developments, and investments in the China semiconductor market for automotive
  • Competitive Assessment: In-depth assessment of market shares, growth strategies, and service offerings of leading players, such as SMIC, GigaDevice Semiconductor Inc., Novosense Microelectronics, Silan Microelectronics, and HiSilicon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

  • 1.1 GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
  • 1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
    • 1.2.1 2010-2014
    • 1.2.2 2015-2020
    • 1.2.3 2021-2025
  • 1.3 KEY FACTORS DRIVING INDUSTRY SHIFT FROM CHINA
    • 1.3.1 REGULATORY FACTORS
      • 1.3.1.1 Restrictive controls by US government
      • 1.3.1.2 Chips Act and other global legislation
      • 1.3.1.3 National security concerns
    • 1.3.2 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
      • 1.3.2.1 Taiwan Strait tensions
      • 1.3.2.2 Russia-Ukraine war
      • 1.3.2.3 Technology alliances
      • 1.3.2.4 Technology limitations
    • 1.3.3 ECONOMIC AND SUPPLY CHAIN FACTORS
      • 1.3.3.1 Rising manufacturing costs in China
      • 1.3.3.2 Incentives from alternative locations
    • 1.3.4 CHALLENGES
      • 1.3.4.1 Dependency on foreign IP & architecture and gaps in certification
      • 1.3.4.2 Heavy reliance on imported semiconductor manufacturing equipment

2 CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 2.1 CURRENT STATE OF CHINA'S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS
    • 2.1.1 MICROCONTROLLERS
      • 2.1.1.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.1.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.2 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS
      • 2.1.2.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.2.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.3 SENSORS & MEMS
      • 2.1.3.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.3.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.4 MEMORY CHIPS
      • 2.1.4.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.4.2 Future roadmap
    • 2.1.5 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
      • 2.1.5.1 Key manufacturers, core competencies, and production capacities
      • 2.1.5.2 Future roadmap
  • 2.2 MARKET VALUE ASSESSMENT

3 KEY PLAYERS IN CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 3.1 DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS
    • 3.1.1 SMIC
      • 3.1.1.1 Overview
      • 3.1.1.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.1.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.1.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.2 GIGADEVICE
      • 3.1.2.1 Overview
      • 3.1.2.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.2.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.2.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.3 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.1.3.1 Overview
      • 3.1.3.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.3.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.3.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.4 SILAN MICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.1.4.1 Overview
      • 3.1.4.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.4.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.4.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.5 HISILICON
      • 3.1.5.1 Overview
      • 3.1.5.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.5.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.5.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.6 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED
      • 3.1.6.1 Overview
      • 3.1.6.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.6.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.6.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.7 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR
      • 3.1.7.1 Overview
      • 3.1.7.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.7.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.7.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.8 NEXPERIA
      • 3.1.8.1 Overview
      • 3.1.8.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.8.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.8.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.9 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES
      • 3.1.9.1 Overview
      • 3.1.9.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.9.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.9.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.10 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP
      • 3.1.10.1 Overview
      • 3.1.10.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.10.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.10.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.11 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.
      • 3.1.11.1 Overview
      • 3.1.11.2 Recent Financials
      • 3.1.11.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.11.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.12 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED
      • 3.1.12.1 Overview
      • 3.1.12.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.12.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.12.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.13 HESAI TECHNOLOGY
      • 3.1.13.1 Overview
      • 3.1.13.2 Recent financials
      • 3.1.13.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.1.13.4 Future strategy
    • 3.1.14 OTHERS
  • 3.2 GLOBAL MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA
    • 3.2.1 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS
      • 3.2.1.1 Overview
      • 3.2.1.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.1.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.1.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.2 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES
      • 3.2.2.1 Overview
      • 3.2.2.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.2.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.2.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.3 STMICROELECTRONICS
      • 3.2.3.1 Overview
      • 3.2.3.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.3.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.3.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.4 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
      • 3.2.4.1 Overview
      • 3.2.4.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.4.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.4.4 Future strategy
    • 3.2.5 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
      • 3.2.5.1 Overview
      • 3.2.5.2 Recent financials
      • 3.2.5.3 Production plants and capacity
      • 3.2.5.4 Future strategy
  • 3.3 JOINT VENTURES AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

4 EXPORT ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS

  • 4.1 KEY EXPORT PRODUCT CATEGORIES
  • 4.2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS
    • 4.2.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231)
    • 4.2.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232)
    • 4.2.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233)
    • 4.2.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239)
    • 4.2.5 PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854290)
  • 4.3 EXPORTS FROM CHINA
    • 4.3.1 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (HS CODE 854231)
      • 4.3.1.1 China
      • 4.3.1.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.2 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES (HS CODE 854232)
      • 4.3.2.1 China
      • 4.3.2.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.3 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS (HS CODE 854233)
      • 4.3.3.1 China
      • 4.3.3.2 Hong Kong, China
    • 4.3.4 ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS) (HS CODE 854239)
      • 4.3.4.1 China
      • 4.3.4.2 Taipei, China
      • 4.3.4.3 Hong Kong, China

5 DIVERSIFICATION OF CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

  • 5.1 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
    • 5.1.1 US-CHINA TRADE TENSIONS
      • 5.1.1.1 US-China tariffs
      • 5.1.1.2 Diversification strategies
    • 5.1.2 TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS
      • 5.1.2.1 US & Chinese technology export controls
      • 5.1.2.2 Impact of export controls
    • 5.1.3 NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
  • 5.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE STRATEGIES
    • 5.2.1 KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM COVID-19 PANDEMIC
      • 5.2.1.1 Realization by China after Covid-19
      • 5.2.1.2 Impact on global players
      • 5.2.1.3 Shift from JIT to strategic resilience
  • 5.3 ECONOMIC FACTORS
    • 5.3.1 RISING MANUFACTURING COSTS IN CHINA
      • 5.3.1.1 Cost comparison
      • 5.3.1.2 Bill of Materials
    • 5.3.2 INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS
  • 5.4 IMPACT ON GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
    • 5.4.1 EFFECTS ON AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTION COSTS
    • 5.4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCE
    • 5.4.3 REGIONAL MANUFACTURING CLUSTERS
    • 5.4.4 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION PATTERNS

6 ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING DESTINATIONS

  • 6.1 OVERVIEW
  • 6.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS
    • 6.2.1 RANKING AS ALTERNATIVES TO CHINA
  • 6.3 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION
  • 6.4 SOUTHEAST ASIA
    • 6.4.1 MALAYSIA
      • 6.4.1.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.1.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.1.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.2 VIETNAM
      • 6.4.2.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.2.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.2.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.3 THAILAND
      • 6.4.3.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.3.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.3.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.4 SINGAPORE
      • 6.4.4.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.4.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.4.3 Challenges
    • 6.4.5 SOUTH KOREA
      • 6.4.5.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.5.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.5.3 Impact of key players
        • 6.4.5.3.1 Samsung
        • 6.4.5.3.2 SK Hynix
      • 6.4.5.4 Challenges
    • 6.4.6 TAIWAN
      • 6.4.6.1 Government incentives and support
      • 6.4.6.2 Key diversifications
      • 6.4.6.3 Impact of key players
        • 6.4.6.3.1 TSMC
      • 6.4.6.4 Challenges
  • 6.5 NORTH AMERICA
    • 6.5.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT
    • 6.5.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS
      • 6.5.2.1 US
      • 6.5.2.2 Mexico
    • 6.5.3 CHALLENGES
  • 6.6 EUROPE
    • 6.6.1 INCENTIVES BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
      • 6.6.1.1 Germany
      • 6.6.1.2 France
      • 6.6.1.3 Italy
    • 6.6.2 EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING HUBS
  • 6.7 INDIA
    • 6.7.1 GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND SUPPORT
    • 6.7.2 KEY DIVERSIFICATIONS
    • 6.7.3 CHALLENGES

7 FUTURE OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS

  • 7.1 PROJECTED INDUSTRY SHIFTS, 2025-2030
  • 7.2 TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP
  • 7.3 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS
    • 7.3.1 DIVERSIFICATION
    • 7.3.2 TECHNOLOGY
    • 7.3.3 SUPPLY CHAIN

List of Tables

  • TABLE 1 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS DOMINATED BY CHINA
  • TABLE 2 US EXPORT CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS
  • TABLE 3 SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMS
  • TABLE 4 PRICE HIKES OF SEMICONDUCTOR-RELATED MATERIALS BEFORE AND AFTER RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
  • TABLE 5 TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 6 COUNTRY-WISE INCENTIVES ON SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS
  • TABLE 7 EQUIPMENT AND KEY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
  • TABLE 8 MICROCONTROLLERS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 9 POWER SEMICONDUCTORS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 10 SENSORS & MEMS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 11 LIDAR: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 12 MEMORY CHIPS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 13 ANALOG & MIXED-SIGNAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS: KEY MANUFACTURERS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES
  • TABLE 14 SMIC: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 15 SMIC: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 16 SMIC: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 17 GIGADEVICE: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 18 GIGADEVICE: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 19 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 20 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 21 NOVOSENSE MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 22 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 23 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 24 SILEN MICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 25 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 26 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY REGION, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 27 HISILICON: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY BUSINESS SEGMENT, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 28 HISILICON: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 29 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 30 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY SERVICE, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 31 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, BY END MARKET, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 32 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 33 HUA HONG SEMICONDUCTOR LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 34 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 35 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 36 BYD SEMICONDUCTOR: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 37 NEXPERIA: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 38 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 39 NEXPERIA: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 40 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 41 CHANGXIN MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 42 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 43 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 44 YANGTZE MEMORY TECHNOLOGIES CORP: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 45 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 46 GOERTEK MICROELECTRONICS INC.: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 47 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 48 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 49 CHINA RESOURCES MICROELECTRONICS LIMITED: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 50 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 51 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 52 HESAI TECHNOLOGY: PRODUCTION CAPACITY
  • TABLE 53 OTHER CHINESE AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS: RECENT FINANCIALS AND PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED
  • TABLE 54 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 55 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 56 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 57 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 58 STMICROELECTRONICS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 59 STMICROELECTRONICS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 60 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 61 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 62 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: RECENT FINANCIALS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 63 RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION: PRODUCTION PLANTS
  • TABLE 64 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS IN CHINA
  • TABLE 65 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 66 CHINA SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, BY PRODUCT, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 67 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 68 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD BILLION)
  • TABLE 69 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 70 EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 71 EXPORTS OF PARTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 72 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 73 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 74 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 75 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS MEMORIES, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 76 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 77 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONICS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS AMPLIFIERS, BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 78 CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 79 TAIPEI, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 80 HONG KONG, CHINA: EXPORTS OF ELECTRONIC INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (EXCL. PROCESSORS, CONTROLLERS, MEMORIES, AND AMPLIFIERS), BY COUNTRY, 2020-2024 (USD MILLION)
  • TABLE 81 US-CHINA TARIFFS, 2023-2025
  • TABLE 82 US TARIFFS ON KEY CHINESE PRODUCTS/COMPONENTS
  • TABLE 83 CHINESE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURERS' DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES
  • TABLE 84 US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON CHINA AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 85 CHINESE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS AND IMPACT ON US AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
  • TABLE 86 CHINA'S ALLEGATIONS OF CYBERSECURITY AND ESPIONAGE
  • TABLE 87 GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN RECALIBRATION: KEY EXAMPLES
  • TABLE 88 COST COMPARISON OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS, 2020-2021 VS. 2024-2025
  • TABLE 89 BILL OF MATERIALS OF AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTORS, 2023 VS. 2024
  • TABLE 90 INCENTIVES/SUBSIDIES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING OUTSIDE CHINA
  • TABLE 91 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MANUFACTURING LOCATIONS
  • TABLE 92 TECHNOLOGY DOMINANCE, BY COUNTRY/REGION
  • TABLE 93 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MALAYSIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 94 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO VIETNAM AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 95 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO THAILAND AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 96 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SINGAPORE AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 97 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO SOUTH KOREA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 98 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO TAIWAN AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 99 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO US AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 100 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO MEXICO AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 101 INCENTIVES FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
  • TABLE 102 EUROPEAN SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING HUBS
  • TABLE 103 PLAYERS DIVERSIFYING TO INDIA AND THEIR AUTOMOTIVE FOCUS
  • TABLE 104 AUTOMOTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP, 2024-2030
  • TABLE 105 STRATEGY FOR COUNTRY SELECTION
  • TABLE 106 STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY SELECTION
  • TABLE 107 STRATEGY FOR COLLABORATIVE MODELS

List of Figures

  • FIGURE 1 SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY TREND, 1987-2023
  • FIGURE 2 GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024
  • FIGURE 3 CHINA AND HONG KONG SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORTS, 2020 VS. 2024