部署微电网作为网络安全解决方案

本报告审视了近期为应对新出现的网络安全威胁而做出的监管努力，并提供了诸如应如何配置微电网以降低网络安全风险脆弱性等信息。它提供。

内容

前言

背景

建议

微电网作为潜在的网络安全解决方案

影响微电网软件供应商和 OEM 的新网络安全标准

欧洲面临来自国家行为者的进一步威胁

分布式能源并网带来的新安全隐患

FERC 命令 2222 可能会增加 DER 聚合导致的漏洞

部署不足的微电网可以传播网络安全攻击媒介

最易受攻击的通信协议

选择保护性微电网通信协议

外围防御提供的保护不足

以同等怀疑态度对待内部和外部用户的零信任架构

ZTA 持续验证

ZTA 将影响降至最低

ZTA 自动化上下文收集和响应

微电网可以与 ZTA 集成以增强网络安全

重要的微电网配置提供独特的网络安全优势

通过网络微电网通信识别攻击

通过网络分段隔离威胁

可以抵御网络攻击的微电网

虚假数据注入攻击

拒绝服务攻击

智能跟踪防火墙

信号欺骗/中间人攻击

使用穿越行程阈值

微电网可用作网络安全措施

入侵检测

自动化事件响应

蜜罐

公用事业和其他消费者必须遵循网络安全防御最佳实践

采用零信任架构

部署多种威胁检测策略

始终独立于或通过 IPv4 网络部署 IPv6 网络

微电网供应商和 OEM 需要将网络安全纳入设计

美国微电网软件开发商和製造商必须利用能源部新的网络安全研发计划和资金

清洁能源网络安全加速器计划

网络安全、能源安全和应急拨款办公室

应考虑网络安全产品的 EaaS 微电网供应商

After domestic extremists attempted several attacks against US bulk electric system (BES) components in 2022, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission warned of a likely escalation of attacks on BES in 2023 and directed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to tighten rules for low-risk systems from vulnerabilities introduced either intentionally or by accident by authorized vendors in electrical component supply chains. NERC's new rules, announced in March 2023, extend many of the same cybersecurity requirements to low-risk system components it imposes on more critical systems.

In a broader effort to address virtual threats, the Biden administration released the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy, which articulates how the White House intends to address cybersecurity threats even as it embarks on the largest expansion of US infrastructure since establishing the interstate highway system.

This Guidehouse Insights study reviews recent regulatory efforts to address emerging cybersecurity threats and explores how microgrids should be configured to reduce their vulnerability to cybersecurity risks. It also looks at how they can be deployed as active cybersecurity solutions, countermeasures that can identify, isolate, and eliminate cybersecurity threats, mitigate damages, and help stakeholders meet new, more stringent cybersecurity regulations.

Table of Contents

Spark

Context

Recommendations

Microgrids Can Be Cybersecurity Solutions

New Cybersecurity Standards Are Impacting Microgrid Software Vendors and OEMs

Europe Faces Additional Threats from State Actors

Distributed Energy Resources Integration Creates New Security Risks

FERC Order 2222 Could Increase Vulnerabilities from DER Aggregations

Poorly Deployed Microgrids Can Open Cybersecurity Attack Vectors

Communications Protocols Present the Greatest Vulnerability

Selecting a Protective Microgrid Communications Protocol

Perimeter Defenses Provide Insufficient Protection

Zero-Trust Architectures Treat Internal and External Users with Equal Suspicion

ZTAs Continuously Verify

ZTAs Minimize Impact

ZTAs Automate Context Collection and Response

Microgrids Can Be Integrated with ZTAs for Additional Cybersecurity

Critical Microgrid Configurations Provide Unique Cybersecurity Benefits

Networked Microgrid Communications Identify Attacks

Network Segmentation Isolates Threats

Microgrids Can Defend Against Cyberattacks

False Data Injection Attacks

Denial of Service Attacks

Smart Tracking Firewall

Signal Spoofing / Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Ride-Through and Trip Threshold Manipulation

Microgrids Can Operate as Cybersecurity Countermeasures

Intrusion Detection

Automated Incident Response

Honey Pots

Utilities and Other Consumers Should Follow Best Cybersecurity Defense Practices

Employ a Zero-Trust Architecture

Deploy Multiple Threat Detection Strategies

Always Deploy IPv6 Networks Independently of, or Tunneled over, IPv4 Networks

Microgrid Vendors and OEMs Should Incorporate Cybersecurity at the Design Stage

U.S. Microgrid Software Developers and Manufacturers Should Avail Themselves of New DOE Cybersecurity R&D Programs and Funding

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Program

Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Grants

EaaS Microgrid Vendors Should Explore Cybersecurity Offerings

List of Tables

Summary and Evaluation of Potential Microgrid Communication Protocols

List of Figures

Five Pillars of the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy and Their Related Strategic Objectives, March 2023

Zero-Trust Implementation Scheme for Remote Access to a Networked Microgrid