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汽车功能安全与预期功能安全 (SOTIF) (2024)
市场调查报告书
商品编码
1420123

汽车功能安全与预期功能安全 (SOTIF) (2024)

Automotive Functional Safety and Safety Of The Intended Functionality (SOTIF) Research Report, 2024
出版日期: | 出版商: ResearchInChina | 英文 365 Pages | 商品交期: 最快1-2个工作天内

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简介目录

随着智慧网联汽车的兴起，汽车EEA的变化正在加速，电子/电气故障的风险越来越高。 因此，功能安全和 SOTIF（预期功能安全）越来越受到关注，特别是在自动驾驶汽车领域。

2023年，标准和政策加速了中国汽车功能安全和SOTIF的发展。 最新的功能安全标准GB_T 34590 2022于2023年7月1日正式生效，国内相关部门也公布了有关功能安全和SOTIF的多项政策。

例如，2023年7月，中国工业和资讯化部公布了《国家车联网行业标准体系建设指南》（2023），制定了功能安全和SOTIF标准. 明确的计划和指导。 2023年8月，工信部等三部门联合印发《新型产业标准化试点实施方案》（2023-2035年），其中《新能源汽车产业连接技术》规定了联网汽车术语和定义、功能标准等标准。安全和SOTIF 流程、稽核和评估、汽车网路安全、资料安全、软体升级以及其他产品和技术应用。

2023年11月17日，工信部、公共安全部、住房城乡建设部、交通部联合发布《关于开展智慧网联汽车准入及道路通行试点的通知》，正式提出L3/L4级自动驾驶准入规范，首次明确高智慧驾驶事故责任，同时启动首批企业评选工作。

本通知明确了汽车企业和车辆的准入要求，特别是安全保障能力。 公司需有能力确保功能安全、SOTIF、网路安全、资料安全、软体升级管理、风险管理、紧急管理等。

智慧网联汽车产品的製程保证要求包括车辆（特别是自动驾驶系统）的功能安全过程保证、自动驾驶系统的SOTIF製程保证、车辆网路安全和资料安全的製程保证。

因此，功能安全和SOTIF已成为中国L3级自动驾驶汽车的准入要求，而将功能安全和SOTIF标准流程落实到L3及以上自动驾驶系统中已成为主机厂和供应商布局的重点。

整车厂和供应商大幅增加汽车功能安全流程和产品认证，并开始布局SOTIF流程认证。

虽然 ISO 26262 不是强制性的全球标准，但它在汽车行业中得到了广泛接受，并已成为汽车供应链参与者的门槛。 OEM 和一级供应商必须拒绝未经 ISO 26262 认证的产品和供应商。 随着智慧汽车的发展，无论是自动驾驶公司或整车厂都越来越重视功能安全和SOTIF。

近年来，无论是国际主流整车厂或中国整车厂都对功能安全和SOTIF更加关注和投入。 特别是长城汽车、上汽集团、吉利汽车、广汽集团、长安汽车、比亚迪等中国自主汽车製造商对关键系统功能安全开发的需求都在不断提高。 除建立功能安全团队外，积极参与功能安全培训，与第三方机构合作，严格把控自主研发产品及整车功能安全产品及流程，提升供应商的功能安全开发能力及功能安全能力。产品的安全能力作为进入供应链的标准。

本报告针对中国汽车产业进行研究和分析，提供功能安全和SOTIF的现状和趋势、标准和政策、认证以及各大公司的解决方案等资讯。

目录

第 1 章汽车功能安全现况及趋势

  • 汽车功能安全的现状
    • 汽车功能安全的定义
    • 汽车功能安全的需求
    • 汽车功能安全的主要特征
    • 汽车功能安全发展史
    • 汽车功能安全目标
    • 汽车功能安全的基本设计原则
    • 典型的汽车功能安全工作流程
    • SEOoC 软体开发流程范例
    • 汽车功能安全的成本结构
    • 汽车功能安全软体工具的分类
    • 汽车功能安全设计与验证方法
    • 汽车功能安全的基本分析方法
    • 汽车功能安全的基本定义
  • 汽车功能安全的发展与演变
    • 汽车功能安全量产困难
    • 汽车功能安全的演进 (1)
    • 汽车功能安全的演进 (2)
    • 营运失败案例
    • 汽车安全综合发展趋势(1)
    • 汽车安全综合发展趋势(2)
    • 汽车安全综合发展趋势(3)
    • 汽车安全整合发展趋势(4)
    • 汽车安全整合发展趋势(5)

第 2 章SOTIF现况及趋势

  • SOTIF 概述
    • SOTIF 的定义
    • 为什么我们提出 SOTIF
    • SOTIF 场景分析
    • SOTIF 的目的
    • SOTIF 方法 (1)
    • 如何分析SOTIF系统
    • L3 SOTIF 的典型设计案例
  • SOTIF 的发展
    • 汽车功能安全与 SOTIF
    • 汽车功能安全与 SOTIF 的整合 (1)
    • 汽车功能安全与 SOTIF 的整合 (2)
    • 汽车功能安全与 SOTIF 流程的集成
    • 汽车功能安全与SOTIF整合开发
    • 汽车功能安全和 SOTIF 验证管理的集成
    • 机器学习、汽车功能安全、SOTIF
    • SOTIF 的技术突破
  • 典型ADAS的SOTIF调查
  • 自动驾驶系统SOTIF

第 3 章有关汽车功能安全和 SOTIF 的标准和政策

  • 国家主要汽车功能安全标准与政策
  • 功能安全标准
  • ISO 26262 简介
  • ISO 21448 简介

第 4 章汽车功能安全开发与SOTIF认证

  • 汽车功能安全认证简介
  • SOTIF 认证
  • ASPICE 简介
  • 主要汽车功能安全认证机构

第 5 章 OEM在汽车功能安全和SOTIF方面的布局

  • 整车厂布局汽车功能安全
  • 主要整车厂在功能安全方面的布局

第 6 章主要汽车零件功能安全要求及解决方案

  • 主要汽车零件的功能安全需求及解决方案
  • 汽车功能安全主要零件供应商及相关产品布局
  • 主要汽车零件功能安全范例

第 7 章各大公司汽车功能安全解决方案

  • Synopsys
  • Jingwei Hirain
  • Vector
  • Bosch
  • Continental
  • NXP
  • Renesas
  • Texas Instruments
  • Infineon
  • eSOL
  • CICV
  • SaimoAI
简介目录
Product Code: CYH115

As intelligent connected vehicles boom, the change in automotive EEA has been accelerated, and the risks caused by electronic and electrical failures have become ever higher. As a result, functional safety and SOTIF (safety of the intended functionality) have caught more attention, especially in the field of autonomous vehicles.

In 2023, standards and policies have speeded up the development of automotive functional safety and SOTIF in China. In addition to the latest functional safety standard GB_T 34590 2022 officially taking into effect on July 1, 2023, related Chinese departments also issued multiple policies concerning functional safety and SOTIF.

For example, in July 2023, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China (MIIT) issued the "Guidelines for the Construction of National Internet of Vehicles Industry Standard System (Intelligent Connected Vehicles) (2023)", which clearly plans and guides the construction of standards for functional safety and SOTIF. In August 2023, the MIIT and other three departments jointly issued the Notice on the New Industry Standardization Pilot Project Implementation Plan (2023-2035), of which the Intelligent Connection Technologies in the New Energy Vehicle Industry stipulates the terms and definition of intelligent connected vehicles, functional safety and SOTIF processes, audits and evaluations, automotive cyber security, data security, software upgrades and other product and technology application standards.

On November 17, 2023, the MIIT, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the Ministry of Transport jointly issued the Notice on the Pilot Program for Access and On-road Passage of Intelligent Connected Vehicles, which officially suggests access specifications for L3/L4 autonomous driving and clarifies the responsibilities in high-level intelligent driving accidents for the first time, and simultaneously started the selection of the first batch of enterprises.

The Notice specifies the requirements for the access of automotive enterprises and vehicles, especially for their safety guarantee capabilities. Enterprises are required to have the ability to guarantee functional safety, SOTIF, cybersecurity, data security, software upgrade management, and risk and emergency management.

The requirements for process guarantee of intelligent connected vehicle products include the functional safety process guarantee of vehicles (especially autonomous driving systems), the SOTIF process guarantee of autonomous driving systems, and the process guarantee of vehicle cybersecurity and data security.

Therefore functional safety and SOTIF have become the access requirements for L3 autonomous vehicles in China, and the introduction of functional safety and SOTIF standard processes into L3 and higher-level autonomous systems has become the layout focus of OEMs and suppliers.

OEMs and suppliers greatly increase automotive functional safety processes and product certifications, and embark on the layout of SOTIF process certification.

Although ISO 26262 is not a global mandatory standard, it has been widely accepted in the automotive industry and has become the threshold for automotive supply chain players. OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers will have to reject products or vendors that are not ISO 26262-certified. As intelligent vehicles develop, both autonomous driving companies and OEMs attach ever more importance to functional safety and SOTIF.

In recent years, both international mainstream OEMs and Chinese automakers have paid more attention to and invested more heavily in functional safety and SOTIF. In particular, Chinese independent automakers such as Great Wall Motor, SAIC, Geely, GAC, Changan and BYD have all raised the requirements for functional safety development of important systems. Besides setting up functional safety teams, they actively participate in functional safety training, cooperate with third-party institutions, strictly control self-developed products and vehicle functional safety products and processes, and take suppliers' functional safety development capabilities and product functional safety capabilities as the criteria to enter their supply chains.

OEMs or suppliers put ever more emphasis on functional safety certification. According to public statistics, from January to November 2023, Chinese companies passed 114 functional safety certifications, including 41 product certifications and 73 process certifications, far more than in 2022 (about 40).

In addition to functional safety certification, the official implementation of SOTIF standards has spurred many OEMs and suppliers such as Great Wall Motor, FAW Hongqi, Changan Automobile, GAC, Horizon Robotics, Jingwei Hirain, Huawei, Desay SV and SenseAuto to deploy SOTIF processes. They have passed SOTIF process certifications in advance, laying a safety foundation for the further layout of autonomous driving systems.

Functional safety, SOTIF, cybersecurity, etc. tends to be developed in from an independent way to an integrated way.

In addition to functional safety, the development of vehicles will have to face other safety challenges in the future, such as SOTIF and cybersecurity. Functional safety and SOTIF focus on system design and verification to ensure that the system can work safely in all situations. Cybersecurity centers on external threats and attacks. In practical application, functional safety, SOTIF and cybersecurity often cross over. In the future, intelligent connected vehicles should solve all the risks related to vehicle safety before they can be delivered in large quantities. The integrated development of the three safety systems has become a major development trend of vehicle safety in the future. Multiple companies like KOSTAL, Neta, Baolong Technology and Pan-Asia Technical Automotive Center are exploring integrated development of safety.

As vehicles carry more complex embedded electronic systems, the risks incurred by software system damage and random hardware damage are increasing. Integrating the ISO 26262 functional safety standard into the Automotive Software Process Improvement and Capability dEtermination (ASPICE) to guide automotive software development will greatly improve automotive system software development quality, development efficiency and product safety.

Table of Contents

1 Status Quo and Trends of Automotive Functional Safety

  • 1.1 Status Quo of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.1 Definition of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.2 Demand for Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.3 Main Features of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.4 Development History of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.5 Purposes of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.6 Basic Design Principle of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.7 General Automotive Functional Safety Workflow
    • 1.1.8 Example of SEooC Software Development Process
    • 1.1.9 Cost Structure of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.10 Classification of Automotive Functional Safety Software Tools
    • 1.1.11 Design and Verification Method of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.12 Basic Analysis Method of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.1.13 Basic Definition Related to Automotive Functional Safety
  • 1.2 Development and Evolution of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.2.1 Difficulties in Mass Production of Automotive Functional Safety
    • 1.2.2 Evolution of Automotive Functional Safety (1)
    • 1.2.3 Evolution of Automotive Functional Safety (2)
    • 1.2.4 Fail Operational Case:
    • 1.2.5 Integrated Development Trends of Automotive Safety (1)
    • 1.2.6 Integrated Development Trends of Automotive Safety (2)
    • 1.2.7 Integrated Development Trends of Automotive Safety (3)
    • 1.2.8 Integrated Development Trends of Automotive Safety (4)
    • 1.2.9 Integrated Development Trends of Automotive Safety (5)

2 Status Quo and Trends of SOTIF

  • 2.1 Overview of SOTIF
    • 2.1.1 Definition of SOTIF
    • 2.1.2 Why to Propose SOTIF
    • 2.1.3 Scenario Analysis of SOTIF
    • 2.1.4 Purposes of SOTIF
    • 2.1.5 SOTIF Methodology (1)
    • 2.1.6 Analysis Method of SOTIF System
    • 2.1.7 Typical Design Cases of L3 SOTIF
  • 2.2 Development of SOTIF
    • 2.2.1 Automotive Functional Safety VS SOTIF
    • 2.2.2 Integration of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF (1)
    • 2.2.3 Integration of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF (2)
    • 2.2.4 Integration of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF Processes
    • 2.2.5 Integrated Development of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF
    • 2.2.6 Verification Management Integration of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF
    • 2.2.7 Machine Learning, Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF
    • 2.2.8 Technical Breakthrough in SOTIF
  • 2.3 Research on SOTIF of Typical ADAS
    • 2.3.1 SOTIF of Lane Keeping System
    • 2.3.2 SOTIF of Automatic Brake Assist System
    • 2.3.3 SOTIF of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) System
    • 2.3.4 SOTIF of Traffic Jam Assist (TJA) System
    • 2.3.5 SOTIF of Automated Parking System
    • 2.3.6 SOTIF Design of Automotive AEB Control Strategy
  • 2.4 SOTIF of Autonomous Driving System
    • 2.4.1 Composition of Autonomous Driving System
    • 2.4.2 Perception-related SOTIF
    • 2.4.3 Prediction-related SOTIF
    • 2.4.4 Decision-making-related SOTIF
    • 2.4.5 Control-related SOTIF Technology
    • 2.4.6 HMI-related SOTIF
    • 2.4.7 SOTIF of V2X

3 Standard and Policies for Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF

  • 3.1 Major National Automotive Functional Safety Standards and Policies
    • 3.1.1 Global Automotive Functional Safety Standards
    • 3.1.2 Development of Foreign Functional Safety and SOTIF Standards
    • 3.1.3 Development of ISO 26262
    • 3.1.4 Automotive Functional Safety in the EU
    • 3.1.5 Development of Automotive Functional Safety in the USA
    • 3.1.6 Development of Automotive Functional Safety Standards in China
    • 3.1.7 Automotive Functional Safety Standards Research Organization in China
    • 3.1.8 Specific Automotive Functional Safety Standards in China
    • 3.1.9 Automotive Functional Safety Standards in China
    • 3.1.10 Test & Evaluation Method of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF
    • 3.1.11 Medium and Long-term Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF Standards Planning in China
    • 3.1.12 Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF Policies in China
    • 3.1.13 Guidelines for the Construction of the National Internet of Vehicles Industry Standard System (Intelligent Connected Vehicles) (2023)
    • 3.1.14 Notice on the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles: Overall Requirements and Organized Implementation
    • 3.1.15 Notice on the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles: Safety Measures
    • 3.1.16 Notice on the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles: Description
    • 3.1.17 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Functional Safety Requirements at Corporate Level
    • 3.1.18 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Corporate Requirements for Functional Safety Guarantee
    • 3.1.19 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Corporate Requirements for SOTIF Guarantee
    • 3.1.21 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Requirements at Product Level
    • 3.1.22 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Requirements for Functional Safety of Vehicles and Autonomous Driving Systems
    • 3.1.23 Guide on the Implementation of the Pilot Program for Admittance and Road Access of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (Trial): Requirements for SOTIF of Vehicles and Autonomous Driving Systems
  • 3.2 Functional Safety Standards
    • 3.2.1 Automotive SOTIF Standards
    • 3.2.2 Requirements of Major National Autonomous Driving System Regulations and Standards on SOTIF
    • 3.2.3 Main SOTIF Standards in China
    • 3.2.4 Construction of SOTIF Standards in China
  • 3.6 Introduction to ISO 26262
    • 3.3.1 ISO 26262
    • 3.3.2 ISO 26262:2011 VS ISO 26262:2018
    • 3.3.3 Content of ISO 26262
    • 3.3.4 ISO 26262-2: Functional Safety Management (1)
    • 3.3.5 ISO 26262-2: Functional Safety Management (2)
    • 3.3.6 ISO 26262-3: Concept of Functional Safety
    • 3.3.7 ISO 26262-3: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) (1)
    • 3.3.8 ISO 26262-3: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) (2)
    • 3.3.9 ISO 26262-3: Functional Safety Goals and Levels of Safety Requirements
    • 3.3.10 ISO 26262-4: System-level Product Development
    • 3.3.11 ISO 26262-4: Concept of Technical Safety
    • 3.3.12 ISO 26262-4: System Project Integration and Testing
    • 3.3.13 ISO 26262-5: Hardware-level Product Development
    • 3.3.14 ISO 26262-5: Hardware design
    • 3.3.15 ISO 26262-5: Hardware Safety Analysis
    • 3.3.16 ISO 26262-5: Hardware Design Verification
    • 3.3.17 ISO 26262-5: Evaluation of Hardware Architecture Metrics
    • 3.3.18 ISO 26262-5: Violation Evaluation of Safety Goals due to Random Hardware Failure
    • 3.3.19 ISO 26262-5: Hardware Integration and Verification
    • 3.3.20 ISO 26262-6: Software Functional Safety
    • 3.3.21 ISO 26262-6: Overview of Software-level Product Development
    • 3.3.22 ISO 26262-6: Software Development Plan
    • 3.3.23 ISO 26262-6: Software Safety Requirements
    • 3.3.24 ISO 26262-6: Software Architecture Design
    • 3.3.25 ISO 26262-6: Software Architecture Design - Software Safety Mechanism
    • 3.3.26 ISO 26262-6: Software Architecture Design - Software Error Handling Mechanism
    • 3.3.27 ISO 26262-6: Software Architecture Design - Software Architecture Verification Method
    • 3.3.28 ISO 26262-6: Software Unit Design and Implementation
    • 3.3.29 ISO 26262-6: Software Unit Verification
    • 3.3.30 ISO 26262-6: Software Unit Test Case Export and Coverage Analysis
    • 3.3.31 ISO 26262-6: Software Integration and Verification
    • 3.3.32 ISO 26262-6: Software Integration Test Coverage
    • 3.3.33 ISO 26262-6: Embedded Software Test
  • 3.4 Introduction to ISO 21448
    • 3.4.1 SOTIF Standards
    • 3.4.2 Development of ISO 21448 for SOTIF
    • 3.4.3 Contents of ISO/CD 21448
    • 3.4.4 Development Process of SOTIF

4 Development of Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF Certification

  • 4.1 Introduction to Automotive Functional Safety Certification
    • 4.1.1 Introduction to Automotive Functional Safety Certification
    • 4.1.2 Functional Safety Certification Types
    • 4.1.3 Main Process of Automotive Functional Safety Certification
    • 4.1.4 Basic Steps of Automotive Functional Safety Process Certification
    • 4.1.5 Basic Steps of Automotive Functional Safety Product Certification
    • 4.1.6 Cases of Automotive Functional Safety Product Certification Process
    • 4.1.7 Achievements of Automotive Functional Safety Certification
    • 4.1.8 Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)
    • 4.1.9 Automotive Software Tool Confidence Level (TCL)
    • 4.1.10 TCL Evaluation Process
    • 4.1.11 Main Functional Safety Certification Methods
    • 4.1.12 Major Third-party Automotive Functional Safety Certification Agencies
    • 4.1.13 Statistics on Automotive Functional Safety Certification of Enterprises in China
  • 4.2 SOTIF Certification
    • 4.2.1 Introduction to SOTIF Certification
    • 4.2.2 Process of SOTIF Certification
    • 4.2.3 SOTIF Guarantee Ssystem Assessment
    • 4.2.4 Main Deliverables of SOTIF Certification Management Process
    • 4.2.5 Third-party SOTIF Certification Agencies
    • 4.2.6 Enterprises with SOTIF Certification
  • 4.3 Introduction to ASPICE
    • 4.3.1 Introduction to ASPICE
    • 4.3.2 Content of ASPICE
    • 4.3.3 ASPICE Levels
    • 4.3.4 Development Process of ASPICE
    • 4.3.5 ASPICE Process Construction and Tool Vendors
    • 4.3.6 Relationship between ASPICE and ISO 26262
    • 4.3.7 Integration of ASPICE and Functional Safety
    • 4.3.8 Integration of ASPICE and Vehicle Development
    • 4.3.9 Introduction to ASPICE Certification
    • 4.3.10 ASPICE Certification Process
    • 4.3.11 ASPICE Certification Review
    • 4.3.12 ASPICE Certification Review: Preparation for Review
    • 4.3.13 ASPICE Certification Review: Review
  • 4.4 Major Automotive Functional Safety Certification Agencies
    • 4.4.1 SGS
      • 4.4.1.1 Functional Safety Services
      • 4.4.1.2 ISO 26262
      • 4.4.1.3 SOTIF Services
      • 4.4.1.4 Main ISO 26262 Customers: International
      • 4.4.1.5 Main ISO 26262 Customers: China
    • 4.4.2 TUV SUD
      • 4.4.2.1 Automotive Functional Safety Certification Services
      • 4.4.2.2 Functional Safety Training Services
    • 4.4.3 TUV Rheinland
      • 4.4.3.1 Automotive Services
      • 4.4.3.2 ISO 26262 Certification Services
      • 4.4.3.3 ASPICE certification
    • 4.4.4 DNV: Functional Safety Products
    • 4.4.5 UL Solutions
      • 4.4.5.1 UL Solutions: Functional Safety Certification Services
      • 4.4.5.2 UL Solutions: SOTIF Certification Services
    • 4.4.6 China Certification Centre for Automotive Products Co., Ltd. (CCAP)
      • 4.4.6.1 CCAP: Functional Safety Certification Services
      • 4.4.6.2 CCAP: ASPICE Technical Services
    • 4.4.7 China Quality Certification Center: Functional Safety Certification Services

5 Layout of OEMs in Automotive Functional Safety and SOTIF

  • 5.1 Layout of OEMs in Automotive Functional Safety
    • 5.1.1 Global Recall Cases due to Automotive Functional Safety Failure
    • 5.1.2 Industrial Division of Labor in Automotive Functional Safety
    • 5.1.3 Work of OEMs and Parts Companies in Functional Safety
    • 5.1.4 Implementation Steps of Functional Safety of OEM Vehicle Projects
    • 5.1.5 OEMs' Evaluation on Suppliers' Functional Safety Capabilities
    • 5.1.6 Challenges and Key Elements in the Implementation of Functional Safety and SOTIF for Automakers
    • 5.1.7 SOTIF Development and Testing Process
    • 5.1.8 OEMs Pay More and More Attention to Functional Safety and SOTIF Requirements
    • 5.1.9 Functional Safety Certification of Major Local OEMs
    • 5.1.10 SOTIF Certification of OEMs
  • 5.2 Layout of Major OEMs in Functional Safety
    • 5.2.1 BMW
      • 5.2.1.1 Safety Strategy
      • 5.2.1.2 Functional Safety of Autonomous Driving Platform Architecture (1)
      • 5.2.1.3 Functional Safety of Autonomous Driving Platform Architecture (2)
    • 5.2.2 Mercedes-Benz
      • 5.2.2.1 Automotive Functional Safety
      • 5.2.2.2 Functional Safety and SOTIF of L3 Drive Pilot
      • 5.2.2.3 Integrated Safety Concept
    • 5.2.3 Ford's Safety Strategy
    • 5.2.4 Volvo's World Tree Intelligent Safety System
    • 5.2.5 Changan Automobile
      • 5.2.5.1 Status quo of Functional Safety Layout
      • 5.2.5.2 Functional Safety Team
      • 5.2.5.3 Business Concept of Functional Safety
      • 5.2.5.4 Software Quality Management: System Construction
      • 5.2.5.5 Software Quality Management: Organizational Settings
      • 5.2.5.6 Functional Safety/SOTIF of Software Quality Management
    • 5.2.6 GAC
      • 5.2.6.1 Functional Safety of the Latest EEA
      • 5.2.6.2 Functional Safety of Intelligent Driving System
      • 5.2.6.3 Functional Safety Certification
    • 5.2.7 Great Wall Motor
      • 5.2.7.1 Functional Safety of GEEP 4.0
      • 5.2.7.2 Functional Safety Certification
    • 5.2.8 Geely
      • 5.2.8.1 Global Safety Layout
      • 5.2.8.3 Functional Safety Certification
      • 5.2.8.3 Functional Safety Design of GEEA 3.0
      • 5.2.8.4 Steer-by-Wire (SbW) Functional Safety Design Solution
    • 5.2.9 Automotive Functional Safety of ENOVATE: Functional Safety Project Implementation (Torque)
    • 5.2.10 Functional Safety Design of NIO SkyOS

6 Functional Safety Requirements and Solutions for Main Auto Parts

  • 6.1 Functional Safety Requirements and Solutions for Main Auto Parts
    • 6.1.1 Fields Involved in Automotive Functional Safety
    • 6.1.2 ASIL Requirements for Main Auto Parts
    • 6.1.3 ASIL Requirements for Common ECUs
    • 6.1.4 Functional Safety Requirements for ADAS
    • 6.1.5 Functional Safety Requirements for HPA
    • 6.1.6 Functional Safety Requirements for ICC System
    • 6.1.7 Functional Safety Requirements for the Underlying Software Layer of Automotive Domain Controllers
  • 6.2 Layout of Main Parts Suppliers and Related Products in Automotive Functional Safety
    • 6.2.1 Layout of Parts Suppliers in Automotive Functional Safety
    • 6.2.2 Functional Safety Certification of Major Operating System Enterprises
    • 6.2.3 Functional Safety Certification of Major Enterprises in Basic Software System
    • 6.2.4 Functional Safety Certification of Major Enterprises in Electric Drive and Power System
    • 6.2.5 Functional Safety Certification of Major Enterprises in BMS, Batteries and Other Fields
    • 6.2.6 Functional Safety Certification in Simulation and Testing Tools
    • 6.2.7 Functional Safety Certification in Main Intelligent Driving Products
    • 6.2.8 Functional Safety Certification in Chips, Domain Controllers and Computing Platforms (1)
    • 6.2.9 Functional Safety Certification in Chips, Domain Controllers and Computing Platforms (2)
    • 6.2.10 Functional Safety Certification in LiDAR, Gateways, Vehicle Lights, etc.
    • 6.2.11 Layout Cases of Suppliers in Functional Safety
    • 6.2.12 Functional Safety and SOTIF of Baidu Apollo
  • 6.3 Functional Safety Cases of Main Auto Parts
    • 6.3.1 Functional Safety Solutions for Chips and Computing Platforms
      • 6.3.1.1 Typical Allocation of Functional Safety in Automotive SoC
      • 6.3.1.2 Automotive SoC Functional Safety Solutions
      • 6.3.1.3 Automotive SoC/MCU Functional Safety Solutions
      • 6.3.1.4 Digital Chip Functional Safety
      • 6.3.1.5 Functional Safety of Automotive Intelligent computing Platforms
      • 6.3.1.6 Functional Safety Assessment of Basic Automotive Computing Platforms
      • 6.3.1.7 Functional Safety of DRAM
      • 6.3.1.8 Functional Safety Design for High-level Autonomous Driving Domain Controllers
    • 6.3.2 Functional Safety of Operating Systems
      • 6.3.2.1 High Safety Requirements of the Next-generation Intelligent Vehicle Operating System
      • 6.3.2.2 Landing of Functional Safety of Intelligent Vehicle Operating Systems
      • 6.3.2.3 Functional Safety of Linux (1)
      • 6.3.2.4 Functional Safety of Linux (2)
      • 6.3.2.5 Functional Safety of Blackberry QNX OS
      • 6.3.2.6 Functional Safety of Automotive Operating Systems
    • 6.3.3 Functional Safety of Automotive Software Systems
      • 6.3.3.1 Technical Difficulties in Functional Safety of Intelligent Vehicle Software
      • 6.3.3.2 Solutions to Technical Difficulties in Functional Safety of Intelligent Vehicle Software
      • 6.3.3.3 V-type Development of Functional Safety of Intelligent Vehicle Software
      • 6.3.3.4 Functional Safety Testing of Intelligent Vehicle Software
      • 6.3.3.5 Development Trends of Functional Safety of Intelligent Vehicle Software
      • 6.3.3.6 Functional Safety Solutions of Blackberry QNX Basic Platform Software
      • 6.3.3.7 Functional Safety of QNX Hypervisor Basic Software Platform
      • 6.3.3.8 Functional Safety of Blackberry QNX-based Cockpit-driving Integrated Controllers
      • 6.3.3.9 Functional Safety of AUTOSAR
      • 6.3.3.10 Autonomous Driving Software Middleware Functional Safety Solutions
    • 6.3.4 Functional Safety of Automotive Intelligent Driving Systems
      • 6.3.4.1 Safety Architecture of ADAS Controllers
      • 6.3.4.2 Safety Architecture of ADAS LDW
      • 6.3.4.3 End-to-end Functional Safety Examples of L2 Autonomous Driving Systems
      • 6.3.4.4 Functional Safety of Autonomous Driving Computing and Decision-making System Platforms
      • 6.3.4.5 Functional Safety of Parking Systems
      • 6.3.4.6 Safety Design Cases of Autonomous Driving Systems
    • 6.3.5 Functional Safety Development of Central Integrated Electronic and Electrical Architectures
      • 6.3.5.1 Functional Safety Development and Design Challenges for Central Integrated EEAs
      • 6.3.5.2 Functional Safety Development Process
      • 6.3.5.3 Functional Safety Development Requirements of Central Integrated EEAs
      • 6.3.5.4 Functional Safety Development Redundancy Design of Central Integrated EEAs
      • 6.3.5.5 Functional Safety Development Cases of Central Integrated EEAs: IM Motors
    • 6.3.6 Functional Safety of Other Automotive Systems
      • 6.3.6.1 Functional Safety Design Features of LiDAR
      • 6.3.6.2 Functional Safety Requirements for Automotive Display
      • 6.3.6.3 PACK Functional Safety Concept
      • 6.3.6.4 Automotive Network Functional Safety
      • 6.3.6.5 Functional Safety Solutions of Steer-by-Wire Systems
      • 6.3.6.6 SOTIF Solutions of Steer-by-Wire Systems

7 Automotive Functional Safety Solutions of Main Enterprises

  • 7.1 Synopsys
    • 7.1.1 Native Automotive Solutions
    • 7.1.2 TestMAX Testing Solutions
    • 7.1.3 Functional Safety Verification Solutions
    • 7.1.4 VC Functional Safety Management
    • 7.1.5 IP for ISO 26262
    • 7.1.6 Functional-safety-standard-compliant IP for ADAS SoC
    • 7.1.7 Functional-safety-standard-compliant IP for Connected Car and Infotainment System SoC
    • 7.1.8 Functional-safety-standard-compliant IP for Gateways
    • 7.1.9 DesignWare IP Subsystem
    • 7.1.10 DesignWare ARC Functional Safety Software
    • 7.1.11 IP for ISO 26262
    • 7.1.12 Dynamics
  • 7.2 Jingwei Hirain
    • 7.2.1 Profile
    • 7.2.2 Functional Safety Solutions for Intelligent Connected Vehicles (1)
    • 7.2.3 Functional Safety Solutions for Intelligent Connected Vehicles (2)
    • 7.2.4 Functional Safety Solutions for Intelligent Connected Vehicles (3)
    • 7.2.5 Intelligent Driving Functional Safety Development Platform
    • 7.2.6 Functional Safety Testing Solutions for Intelligent Connected Vehicles
    • 7.2.7 Intelligent Driving Functional Safety & SOTIF Development and Verification Platform
    • 7.2.8 SOTIF Solutions
  • 7.3 Vector
    • 7.3.1 Vector: Functional Safety Solutions
    • 7.3.2 PREEvision Design Tools Support Functional Safety Process
    • 7.3.3 MICROSAR Safe
  • 7.4 Bosch
    • 7.4.1 Functional Safety Services
    • 7.4.2 TARA
    • 7.4.3 System Redundancy Design Solution
    • 7.4.4 Functional Safety Design of Hybrid Vehicles
    • 7.4.5 Mainstream Smart Cockpit Functional Safety Solutions
  • 7.5 Continental
    • 7.5.1 Functional Safety Services
    • 7.5.2 Functional Safety Training Services
  • 7.6 NXP
    • 7.6.1 Organizational Structure ofo Automotive Functional Safety
    • 7.6.2 Functional Safety Solutions: SafeAssure (1)
    • 7.6.3 Functional Safety Solutions: SafeAssure (2)
    • 7.6.4 Functional Safety Solutions
    • 7.6.5 Confirmation Measures in ISO 26262
    • 7.6.6 The Development Process Conforms to ISO 26262
    • 7.6.7 Functional Safety Levels of Basic System Chips
    • 7.6.8 Functional Safety Architecture of the Next-generation Platform
    • 7.6.9 Functional Safety Architecture of the Next-generation Platform: Hardware Safety
    • 7.6.10 Functional Safety Architecture of the Next-generation Platform: Safety Software Development Kit (SDK) (1)
    • 7.6.11 Functional Safety Architecture of the Next-generation Platform: Safety Software Development Kit (SDK) (2)
    • 7.6.12 Functional Safety Architecture of the Next-generation Platform: Safety Software Combination
    • 7.6.13 ASIL-D-compliant ECU Architecture Design
    • 7.6.14 ASIL-D-compliant L3/L4 Autonomous Driving Architecture
    • 7.6.15 Autonomous Driving Functional Safety Solutions
  • 7.7 Renesas
    • 7.7.1 Automotive Electronic Functional Safety Technical Support Projects
    • 7.7.2 Quantitative Analysis Tools Simplify ISO 26262 Certification
    • 7.7.3 Automotive Electronic Functional Safety Technical Support Projects
    • 7.7.4 ASIL-D System Security Mechanism of V3U with Self-diagnosis Capability
  • 7.8 Texas Instruments
    • 7.8.1 Product Types for Functional Safety Design
    • 7.8.2 Functional Safety Services
    • 7.8.3 Standard Quality Management Development Process
  • 7.9 Infineon
    • 7.9.1 Classification of Automotive-grade Products (1)
    • 7.9.2 Classification of Automotive-grade Products (2)
    • 7.9.3 Functional Safety Solutions
    • 7.9.4 Overall Functional Safety Solutions
    • 7.9.5 Functional Safety Solutions
    • 7.9.6 Building Blocks with Integrated Functional Safety
    • 7.9.7 Power Distribution System Functional Safety Solutions
  • 7.10 eSOL
    • 7.10.1 Main Tools for Functional Safety
    • 7.10.2 Activities and Tools for Functional Safety Standards
    • 7.10.3 Consulting Services for Functional Safety Standards
    • 7.10.4 Documentation Package Products Related to Automotive Functional Safety
  • 7.11 CICV
    • 7.11.1 Profile
    • 7.11.2 Functional Safety Software Tools
    • 7.11.3 Quality Management Features and Tools of Functional Safety
    • 7.11.4 Review of Functional Safety Software Tools
    • 7.11.5 SOTIF Working Group
    • 7.11.6 SOTIF Development Process
  • 7.12 SaimoAI
    • 7.12.1 Profile
    • 7.12.2 SOTIF Analysis Tool: Safety Pro (1)
    • 7.12.3 SOTIF Analysis Tool: Safety Pro (2)
    • 7.12.4 External Cooperation